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“From Savigny through Sir Henry Maine”: Roscoe Pound’s Flawed Portrait of James
Coolidge Carter’s Historical Jurisprudence
Lewis A. Grossman

I. Carter’s European Influences
In Roscoe Pound’s scathing 1909 review of Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function,
American jurist James Coolidge Carter’s posthumously published magnum opus, Pound asserted
that Carter’s conception of law “comes from Savigny through Sir Henry Maine.”1 Frederich
Karl von Savigny (1779-1861) and Sir Henry Maine (1822-1888) were the most prominent
representatives of the German and English historical schools of jurisprudence, respectively. For
his part, Carter (1827-1905) was the leading representative of historical jurisprudence in the
United States. Indeed, when Pound himself discussed the historical school’s influence in the
United States, Carter was usually the only scholar he referred to by name.
Other scholars, following Pound, have similarly linked Carter to Savigny and Maine,
especially to the former. Moreover, various authors have noted the great effect these European
jurists had on American legal thought in general in the late nineteenth century.2 However, with
the notable exception of an article by Matthias Reimann comparing Carter and Savigny,3 few if
any studies have closely analyzed the impact Savigny and Maine had on Carter or other

1

Roscoe Pound, review of Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function, by James C. Carter, Political Science
Quarterly 24 (1909): 317.
2

See, e.g., James E. Herget, American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970 (Houston: Rice University Press, 1990),

22-30.
3
Mathias Reimann, “Historical School Against Codification: Savigny, Carter and the Defeat of the New
York Civil Code,” American Journal of Comparative Law 37 (1989): 95-119.
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particular American legal thinkers.4 Because Carter’s perceived debt to these giants of
jurisprudence has significantly influenced how others have viewed him, and the American
historical school generally, it is important to examine the precise extent and nature of this debt.
In 1889, Carter wrote a letter that reveals much about the state of his jurisprudential
knowledge at the time. In this letter, to E. L. Godkin, he asked Godkin, the editor of The Nation,
to circulate The Provinces of the Written and the Unwritten Law among an audience more
learned than the practicing bar. Carter explained that he wanted to gauge the “truth” and
“importance” of his jurisprudential theories. He continued, “You may think I ought to find this
out very easily from my own professional friends. But very few of them are competent to form
an opinion, and a still smaller number will take the necessary interest. I was just as ignorant and
inattentive myself until circumstances [the battle against codification] compelled me to give
close attention to the subject.”5
Carter’s handwritten note continued:

What I suppose to be new in the essay is its conception of the genesis of law. Upon this
subject lawyers, especially the older ones are as ignorant as other people. It is not taught
in Coke, or Blackstone, or Kent or Story. In more recent years a great crop of writers
upon the subject of general jurisprudence has grown up, of which Austin is the
recognized chief. I have not closely studied all of them, and there may possibly be some
of whom I am wholly ignorant. I don’t think very much of them. They have a way of
pointing us to crude states of society, village communities etc. in order to show the origin
and nature of law. To my mind the thing is going on right before our eyes every day and
we have only to thoroughly scrutinize the process to learn just what it is. I think, as I

4

David M. Rabban points to this dearth of studies in “The Historiography of Late Nineteenth-Century
American Legal History,” Theoretical Inquiries in Law 4 (2003): 556. Rabban’s work-in-progress is helping to fill
this gap.
5
James Coolidge Carter to E. L. Godkin, November 15, 1889, Godkin Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard
University.
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have endeavored to show, that it consists simply in taking the social standard or ideal of
practice, just as we find it in any political [society] and applying it to the transactions of
man, and that this is done by simply observing the actual transactions and classifying
them, in the same way as facts are observed in any inductive science.6

A number of interesting facts can be gleaned from this letter. First, it demonstrates that
Carter himself was almost completely unversed in legal theory before he joined the codification
battle in the early 1880s. By his own admission, he familiarized himself with the jurisprudential
literature and developed his own ideas about the origin and nature of law for the specific purpose
of resisting codification. Second, the letter’s failure even to mention to Savigny suggests that the
German jurist was not a primary influence on Carter at this point. Third, the letter indicates that
Carter had read at least some of the works of Maine, who (not John Austin) was the “recognized
chief” of the English school of comparative historical jurists to which he refers. Carter’s allusion
to “village communities” is telling, for Maine had published a series of lectures titled Village
Communities in the East and West and had also extensively discussed the subject in his more
widely available Early History of Institutions.7 In the latter book, Maine explicitly and
exhaustively challenged Austin’s definition of law as a command proceeding from the state’s
sovereign power and enforced by a sanction.8 Carter’s mistaken reference to Austin as the leader
of the English historical school most likely resulted from a “slip of the pen.” The alternative

6

Ibid. (emphasis in original).

7

Henry Maine, Village Communities in the East and West (New York: Holt, 1976); Henry Maine, Lectures
on the Early History of Institutions (A Sequel to ‘Ancient Law’) (New York: Henry Holt, 1888). For references to
village communities in the latter work, see, e.g., 381, 389. The English edition of Early History of Institutions was
published in 1875.
8

Maine, Early History of Institutions, lect. 12.
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explanation is that Carter remained shockingly unfamiliar with the jurisprudential canon, even at
this relatively late date.
In short, Carter’s missive to Godkin suggests that rather than simply borrowing his
jurisprudence from other thinkers, Carter conceived it largely on his own. Nonetheless, in light
of Savigny’s and Maine’s enormous influence over western legal thought in the nineteenth
century, it is worthwhile to compare Carter’s work to theirs and to consider whether the New
Yorker’s historical jurisprudence had more of a German or English flavor.

Carter and Savigny
Pound claimed to have identified a specific path of influence from Savigny to Carter. He
speculated that the first scholar to teach the doctrines of German historical jurisprudence in the
United States was Luther S. Cushing, a lecturer on Roman Law at Harvard Law School from
1849 to 1851.9 Pound remarked, “It is interesting to note that the late James C. Carter was a
student at Cambridge the last year that [Cushing’s] course was given, for unless the effect of
early training is borne in mind, it is hard to understand how a jurist of his caliber could
dogmatically assert Savigny’s views in 1905.”10
But even if Carter studied Savigny and the German historicists in law school, he does not
appear to have retained very much knowledge about them. After all, in his letter to Godkin, he
acknowledged that he was “ignorant” about and “inattentive” to jurisprudential theory until he

9

Roscoe Pound, “Political and Economic Interpretations of Jurisprudence,” Proceedings of the American
Political Science Association 9 (1912): 99. The years that Cushing delivered the lectures are mentioned in Michael
H. Hoeflich, “Bibliographical Perspectives on Roman and Civil Law,” Law Library Journal 89 (1997): 51.
10

Pound, “Political and Economic Interpretations of Jurisprudence,” 99-100.
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entered the codification fight. Moreover, in this letter, Carter excluded Savigny from the list of
jurists (Coke, Blackstone, Kent, and Story) with whom “older” lawyers like him were familiar.
This omission suggests that Carter did not deem German historical jurisprudence to be a central
aspect of his Harvard Law School education. If Carter was a Savigny disciple, he became one
late in life.
When Carter turned his attention to Savigny decades after leaving Harvard, it is unclear
how thoroughly he did so. There is no evidence that Carter was familiar with the intricacies of
Savigny’s thought, or with any his works other than Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation
and Jurisprudence.11 He rarely cited Savigny, and he invoked the German jurist’s customary
theory of law only once.12 On the other hand, on one of the few occasions when Carter
mentioned Savigny, he called him “the most accomplished philosophical jurist of his time, at
once profound and practical.”13
As Carter constructed his jurisprudential argument against codification, Savigny likely
had some influence on him, at least in a broad sense. The similarities between the two thinkers
are obvious. Like Carter, Savigny is renowned largely for his opposition to codification. He led
the battle against Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut’s 1814 proposal to codify German law. As
11
Frederick Charles von Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age for Legislation and Jurisprudence, Abraham
Hayward trans. (London: Littlewood, [1831]). Carter, in his book, quotes from another work by Savigny, System des
heutigen römischen Rechtsbut, but he acknowledges that he found the quotation in Holland’s Elements of
Jurisprudence. Carter, Law: Origin, Growth and Function (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1907), 4-6.
12

The direct reference is at James Coolidge Carter, The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law (New
York: Evening Post Job Printing Office, 1884), 41. See infra note 18. On two other occasions, Carter, in footnotes,
quoted a Scottish journal article that itself referred to Savigny’s theory of the source of unwritten law. See James
Coolidge Carter, The Provinces of the Written and the Unwritten Law (New York, Banks and Brothers, Law
Publishers, 1889), 51. Carter, Origin, Growth and Function, 331 (quoting J. A. Dixon in Journal of Jurisprudence).
Admittedly, none of Carter’s works used extensive citations, so the lack of citations to Savigny does not in and of
itself demonstrate a lack of influence.
13

Carter, Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function, 5.
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Matthias Reimann remarks, “[I]n several important regards, the Field-Carter dispute seems like a
replay of the Thibaut-Savigny debate.”14 In Savigny’s Of the Vocation of Our Age for
Legislation and Jurisprudence, his famous pamphlet responding to Thibaut, he asserted that law
was developed “by internal silently-operating powers, not by the arbitrary will of a law-giver.”15
Savigny thus prefigured Carter’s own opposition to Austinian positivism. According to Savigny,
there was

an organic connection of law with the being and character of the people. . . . For law, as
for language, there is no moment of absolute cessation; it is subject to the same
movement and development as every other popular tendency; and this very development
remains under the same law of inward necessity, as in its earliest stages. Law grows with
the growth, and strengthens with the strength of the people, and finally dies away as the
nation loses its nationality.16

Savigny’s cyclical image of the rising and falling of nations and their legal systems
contrasted with Carter’s Whiggish depiction of law ineluctably evolving toward a universal
ideal. Nonetheless, Carter’s linkage of law to the “social standard of justice” shared much with
Savigny’s assertion that “the common consciousness of the people is the peculiar seat of law.”17
Indeed, when Carter set forth his customary theory of law for the first time, in the following
passage from The Proposed Codification of Our Common Law, he included a footnote citing

14

Mathias Reimann, “Historical School Against Codification,” 102.

15

Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age, 30.

16

Ibid., 27.

17

Ibid., 28.
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Savigny’s Of the Vocation of Our Age—although this was apparently the only instance in which
he ever mentioned that work in print.

All well conceived efforts to make, or to declare, law, are, therefore, efforts to apply [the]
public, or, as we have styled it, national standard of justice to human conduct. This
national standard . . . is the final result of the moral and intellectual life and culture of a
nation, the product of all the influences, public and private, which tend to cultivate and
develop men’s conceptions of what is just, expedient and useful, and which is
unconsciously perceived and felt by every individual member of society by reason of the
fact that he is such a member, and exposed to the like influences with his fellows.18

There are other similarities in Savigny’s and Carter’s jurisprudence. Although opposition
to complete codification does not necessarily equal opposition to legislation generally, Savigny
and Carter appear to have shared a deep-seated aversion to the latter, as well. Carter, despite an
increasing ambivalence about legislation toward the end of his life, still instinctively resisted it.
He told E. L. Godkin, “I can render no greater service in my day and generation than by
defeating the various schemes of codification and other forms of over-legislation.”19 Savigny
seems to have thought similarly. As James Q. Whitman observes:

[T]he Savigny who mounted his influential defense of professorial lawmaking
could be called . . . a kind of scholarly anti-statist. It was Savigny’s hope that the
charismatic Roman-law professors, sheltered within the free universities, could
form the basis for a true spontaneous order . . . that . . . represented a kind of
intellectual laissez-faire. Thus his Vom Beruf unserer Zeit attacked

18

Carter, Proposed Codification, 41 (citing Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age). Interestingly, both Carter
and Savigny are best known for terms they did not initially use. Just as Carter did not call his social standard of
justice custom in his earliest work, Savigny did not label his “common consciousness of the people” as Volksgeist
until later in his career, when he borrowed the term from Puchta. See Mathias Reimann, “Nineteenth-Century
German Legal Science,” Boston College Law Review 31 (1990): 853.
19

James C. Carter to E. L. Godkin, 15 Nov. 1889, Godkin Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University.
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codificationism on liberal grounds: those who demanded a code, Savigny said,
proceeded from the false belief that all law must grow out of ‘statutes–that is,
express prescriptions of the highest state power.’20

Another, related similarity between Savigny and Carter was the way in which both men
assigned legal elites a prominent role in advancing the development of law, despite the source of
law in the spirit of the people.21 Savigny, who was a professor of Roman law at the University of
Berlin, contended that law had a “twofold life; first, as a part of the aggregate existence of the
community, which it does not cease to be; and, secondly, as a distinct branch of knowledge in
the hands of the jurists.”22 Savigny did not see any inconsistency in anchoring law in the culture
of the people and then assigning exclusive stewardship over it to specialized experts. As
Reimann explains, “‘Culture’ [to Savigny] was not the totality of habits of a people, but the
characteristics of its intellectual life. When this life grew more sophisticated over time, the ideas
of intellectual elites in their respective fields shaped it more and more. In respect to law,
therefore, the jurists represented the nation as a culture.”23 James Q. Whitman evocatively
describes the role of law professors in Savigny’s legal order as “vicars of the Volk.”24
Carter, like Savigny, spoke of private jurisprudence as a “science,” although he viewed
judges and lawyers, not legal scholars, as “the masters of that science.”25 There are undeniable

20

Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990): 111.

21

Reimann, “The Historical School,” 110-13.

22

Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age, 28.

23

Reimann, “The Historical School,” 854.

24

Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law, 109.

25

Carter, Proposed Codification, 88.
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parallels in the way Savigny and Carter sought to preserve the influence of their own
professional communities. Carter told the Virginia State Bar Association:

With us public improvement can be brought about only by the voluntary efforts of the
people themselves; and in the realm of law the people at large are wholly incompetent to
the task. The members of the legal profession alone are able to contrive the methods by
which the administration of justice can be best secured. Sciences can be advanced only
by the labor of experts, and we are the experts in the science of the law.26

Savigny would have wholly concurred with this statement, apart from its reference to
practitioners rather than academic jurists.
Despite these similarities, however, there was a crucial difference between Savigny’s and
Carter’s visions of “legal science.” As Reimann has observed, they diverged on the role of
conceptual order and logical reasoning in law.27 Savigny combined the historical aspects of his
jurisprudence with a commitment to building a coherent, logically-ordered system of law. In
Reimann’s words, “Once the leading principles had been found, the historical work had been
done. . . . The legal scientists could then begin to build a truly scientific system with these
principles.”28 In other words, Savigny believed that conceptual system-building was a critical
aspect of legal science. Indeed, he thought it became the most important task of all once jurists
obtained a certain level of historical knowledge. Savigny analogized law in its advanced stage to
geometry.

26

Carter, Provinces, 60.

27

Reimann, “The Historical School,” 108-110.

28

Reimann,“German Legal Science,” 854.
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In every triangle . . . there are certain data, from the relations of which all the rest are
necessarily deducible: thus, given two sides and the included angle, the whole triangle is
given. In like manner, every part of our law has points by which the rest may be given:
these may be termed the leading axioms. To distinguish these, and deduce from them the
internal connection, and precise degree of affinity which subsist between all juridical
notions and rules, is amongst the most difficult of the problems of jurisprudence. Indeed,
it is peculiarly this which gives our labours the scientific character.29

It is unclear what role, if any, Savigny assigned to the study of contemporary societal
developments in advanced legal science. On the one hand, he thought that historically-derived
principles could logically generate the rules for modern cases. On the other hand, he was
convinced that jurists, in some hard-to-define way, ensured that the law continued to reflect the
organic evolution of these principles.30 Consequently, even in highly-developed nations, where
the law was solely in the hands of the jurists, the “general consciousness of the people”
continued to “shew [sic] itself in particular applications.”31
In any event, conceptual order played a vital role in Savigny’s thought, and he saw
logical reasoning as the primary vehicle for the growth of law in his own time. For many of
Savigny’s followers in the German historical school, the systematic aspect of his jurisprudence
was far more influential than the historical component. They almost entirely neglected the facet
of Savigny’s project dedicated to identifying legal principles through historical work. Instead,
scholars such as Puchta and Jhering (early in his career) concentrated on creating a conceptuallyordered legal system, with logically arranged principles capable of generating new law through

29

Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age, 39.

30

Reimann, “German Legal Science,” 854; Whitman, The Legacy of Roman Law, 109-10, 117-20.

31

Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age, 29.
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deductive processes.32 The German Pandectists represented the apotheosis of this approach; they
artificially extrapolated one part of Justinian’s Digest into a complete, timeless, logically
coherent system, utterly disconnected from reality.33
By contrast, the systematic component of Savigny’s jurisprudence had little or no impact
on Carter. As I have explored elsewhere,34 he evinced minimal interest in the logical
arrangement of law, and he objected to deciding cases by deduction from general rules, because
he thought such an approach generated unjust results. Moreover, Carter’s legal science was not
nearly so autonomous as Savigny’s, let alone Puchta’s. With increasing frequency as the years
passed, Carter maintained that judges should refer directly to societal customs as well as to
judicial precedents.35
Interestingly, Savigny’s and Carter’s contrasting views about the desirability of deductive
legal reasoning led them to different conclusions regarding the ultimate possibility of
satisfactory codification. Like Carter, Savigny understood that it was impossible to draft enough
code provisions to address every situation directly. He explained, “[T]his undertaking must fail,
because there are positively no limits to the varieties of actual combinations of circumstances.”36
Both men thus recognized that under a code system, judges must resolve particular cases by

32

Reimann, “German Legal Science,” 859-71. Jhering later abandoned formalism and conceptualism almost
entirely when he advanced a new, sociological type of jurisprudence that anticipated legal realism. Ibid., 840, 861 n.
93.
33

Ibid., 866-67; John P. Dawson, Oracles of the Law (Ann Arbor: Univ. of Michigan Law School, 1968),
450-58. Dawson observes that the Pandectist approach was an important and direct precursor to the German Civil
Code, which the legislature approved in 1896 and which took effect in 1900. Ibid., 459-61.
34

Grossman, “Langdell Upside-Down,” Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities 19 (2007): 149-219.

35

Ibid., 190-93.

36

Savigny, Of the Vocation of Our Age, 38.
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deduction from general rules. However, whereas Carter concluded from these observations that
codification was inevitably problematic, Savigny, who heartily embraced geometric order and
logical decision making, did not reject codification out of hand. He doubted the feasibility of
codification in his own age, because he did not think German legal scientists had yet acquired
the requisite logical or linguistic skill to create a decent code.37 Nonetheless, he did not oppose
codification in principle.38 As Reimann observes, “Savigny considered legal science mostly as a
logical system and thus as an indispensible [sic] prerequisite for codification. For Carter legal
science was a certain empirical method which made codification nonsensical.”39
In sum, although there were striking similarities between Savigny and Carter, their
jurisprudence diverged in important ways. As will be discussed later, Roscoe Pound’s failure to
recognize these differences helps explain why his critical portrait of Carter was profoundly
inaccurate.40

Carter and Maine
When Pound, in his 1909 review of Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function, identified Sir
Henry Maine as the transmission belt for Savigny’s ideas, he granted the Englishman more
influence over Carter than he usually did. Normally, he depicted Carter a direct imitator of
Savigny. Pound could not, however, fail to discern echoes of Maine in Carter’s final work.

37

Ibid., 36-43.

38

Reimann, “The Historical School,” 105.

39

Ibid., 110-11.

40

See pp. [ ], below.
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Carter’s anticodification tracts may have borrowed more from Savigny, but his posthumously
published magnum opus owed at least as much to Maine.
There are obvious parallels between Carter’s book, on the one hand, and Maine’s
Ancient Law and its sequel, Early History of Institutions, on the other.41 In writing Origin,
Growth, and Function (which cites these works by Maine repeatedly), Carter clearly emulated
the Englishman’s comparative approach, his attention to customary law in primitive societies,
and his sensitivity to the social context of law. Carter’s debt to Maine is most apparent in the
hundred-page “survey of human life in all ages and in all stages of social progress” that makes
up most of the first third of Origin, Growth, and Function.42
Maine’s jurisprudential conclusions also influenced Carter. Sir Henry contrasted
primitive and non-western societies, in which “the great bulk of men derive their rules of life
from the customs of their village or city,” with modern society, in which “the Sovereign is ever
more actively legislating on principles of his own, while local custom and idea are ever
hastening to decay.”43 According to Maine, a careful examination of ancient law demonstrated
the inadequacy John Austin’s definition of law as a command emanating from a determinate
sovereign and backed by coercive force.44 Carter remarked that he and Maine fully agreed that
Austin’s doctrine was “erroneous in the past to the point of absurdity.”45

41

Henry Sumner Maine, Ancient Law: Its Connection with the Early History of Society, and its Relation to
Modern Ideas (London: John Murray, 1861); Maine, Early History of Institutions.
42

Carter, Origin, Growth and Function, 118-19.

43

Maine, Early History of Institutions, 392.

44

See generally ibid., lects. 12 and 13.

45

Carter, Origin, Growth and Function, 201.
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Despite these similarities, however, Carter’s book quarreled with Maine more than it
agreed with him. Carter’s ambivalence about Maine is not surprising in light of the fact that
early in Ancient Law, Sir Henry seemed to speak sympathetically of codification and to criticize
the manner in which “a rule of English law has first to be disentangled from the recorded facts of
adjudged printed precedents, then thrown into a form of words varying with the taste, precision,
and knowledge of the particular judge, and then applied to the circumstances of the case for
adjudication.”46 As Cocks observes: “Maine was at least as insistent as Bentham in attacking
what he saw as the absurd, almost mystical, claims of the judiciary to be the only group of
British society which understood the law. He was always ready to attack the idea that there was
something special about the common law because it was unwritten.”47
Although Maine’s discussion of primitive law bolstered Carter’s argument that custom
was the root of all law, the Englishman’s treatment of contemporary law did not. Maine wrote
that Austin’s command theory, though false with regard to homogenous ancient villages, was
largely accurate with regard to modern nation states, with their expansive territory and subsumed
subgroups. “When . . . the rules which have to be obeyed once emanate from an authority
external to the small natural group and forming no part of it, they wear a character wholly unlike
that of a customary rule. They lose the assistance of superstition, probably that of opinion,

46

Maine, Ancient Law, 14.

47
R. C. J. Cocks, Sir Henry Maine: A Study in Victorian Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), 64-65.
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certainly that of spontaneous impulse. The force at the back of law comes therefore to be purely
coercive force to a degree quite unknown in societies of the more primitive type.”48
In other words, Maine acknowledged that Austin’s definition of law had value—not as an
insight into the essence of law, but as a description of its present condition. In Maine’s view, the
primary feature of the modern state that tended to bolster Austin’s theory was the centrality of
legislation. “The capital fact in the mechanism of modern States is the energy of legislatures.”49
Maine observed that although “the Analytical Jurists failed to see a great deal which can only be
explained by the help of history, they saw a great deal which even in our day is imperfectly seen
by those who, so to speak, let themselves drift with history. Sovereignty and Law, regarded as
facts, had only gradually assumed a shape in which they answered to the conception of them
formed by Hobbes, Bentham, and Austin, but the correspondence really did exist by their time
and was tending constantly to become more perfect.”50
For many years, scholars focused on the gulf between Maine and Austin and ignored
their commonalities. Recently, however, Maine scholars have also begun to emphasize the
positions he shared with Austin.51 From this perspective, Carter was a scholar ahead of his time,
for he perceived the similarities between the two English jurists almost a century ago. In Law:
Its Origin, Growth and Function, he remarked, “The wonder is that Prof. Maine, after dealing as

48

Maine, Early History of Institutions, 392-93. Maine thought Austin’s theory of law was also quite
accurate with regard to the Roman Empire. Ibid.
49

Ibid., at 398.

50

Ibid., 396-97.

51

For Richard Cosgrove’s historiographic discussion of the reception of Maine’s work, see Scholars of the
Law (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 119-47. Cosgrove acknowledges that some early
commentators, for example James Fitzjames Stephen, emphasized the complementary nature of Maine’s and
Austin’s ideas, rather than their conflict. Ibid., 145.
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he does with Austin’s theory, still continues to regard it as of such high value as a contribution to
jurisprudence.”52 Carter repeatedly lashed out at Maine for accepting Austin’s definition of law
with regard to modern society.

Prof. Maine draws a remarkable conclusion . . . as erroneous as it is remarkable. It is that
in the passage of these local communities into an extended and centralised empire the
laws distinctly altered their character; that while before the passage they rested upon
custom, and were obeyed almost blindly and instinctively, seeming to be parts of mere
order, after the passage they were broken up and replaced by rules directly emanating
from the sovereign, and the power behind them assumed the attitude and character of
purely coercive Force; that the theory of Bentham and Austin, while wholly inapplicable
to Oriental conditions, and to the primitive social conditions of Europe, did represent
those in Europe which came into existence after the change; that legislative activity has
rapidly increased and is increasing, and that eventually Austin’s formula that law is the
command of the sovereign will be as true in fact as it is elegant in theory.53

Because Carter embraced the customary theory with regard to modern as well as ancient
law, he viewed his own jurisprudence as a rejection of Maine, particularly the Englishman’s
assertion that legislation superseded unwritten law in modern societies. Indeed, in Origin,
Growth, and Function, Carter introduced and concluded his lecture on the futility of customabrogating legislation with critiques of Maine.54 In light of the fact that Carter formulated his
jurisprudence as part of the campaign against codification, it is not surprising that he vigorously
rejected Maine’s assertion that there existed an ineluctable trend toward legislative supremacy.

52

Carter, Origin, Growth and Function, 195.

53

Carter, Origin, Growth and Function, 199-200. For similar criticisms of Maine by Carter, see ibid., 19394, 218-19.
54
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Nevertheless, by focusing so intensively on the similarities between Maine and Austin,
Carter arguably erred as much as those scholars who have stressed only the differences. Maine’s
articulation of his theory of law was quite ambiguous, and Carter could have found support in Sir
Henry’s work for his own anti-Austinian position that, even in modern times, the efficacy of
legislation did not depend solely on enforcement by the sovereign. Maine argued:

The vast mass of influences, which we may call for shortness moral, perpetually shapes,
limits or forbids the actual direction of the forces of society by its Sovereign. This is the
point which . . . does most to show what the Austinian view of Sovereignty really
is—that it is the result of Abstraction. It is arrived at by throwing aside all the
characteristics and attributes of Government and Society except one, and by connecting
all forms of political superiority together through their common possession of force. The
elements neglected in the process are always important, sometimes of extreme
importance, for they consist of all the influences controlling human action except force
directly applied or directly apprehended.55

In other words, although Maine argued, as an empirical matter, that Austin’s command
theory was increasingly valid in the modern age, he also maintained, in opposition to Austin’s
school, that legal scholars must take into account all aspects of social reality, including the
customs and opinions of the people. “[I]t is its history, the entire mass of its historical
antecedents, which in each community determines how the Sovereign shall exercise or forbear
from exercising his irresistible coercive power. All that constitutes this—the whole enormous
aggregate of opinions, sentiments, beliefs, superstitions, and prejudices, of ideas of all kinds,
hereditary and acquired, some produced by institutions and some by the constitution of human
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nature—is rejected by the Analytical Jurists.”56 Although Carter disagreed with Maine’s
assessment of the relative importance of sovereign force and societal custom, his vision of
modern law had more in common with Maine’s than he realized.
Finally, Carter’s work resembled Maine’s in its utter disregard for the formalistic and
conceptual aspects of law. Maine condemned the “abstract” nature of Austin’s analytical
jurisprudence.57 He disapprovingly observed that the analytical school’s approach was “closely
analogous to that followed in mathematics.”58 Maine’s resistance to this aspect of Austin’s work
was based on his belief that “the deductions from an abstract principle are never from the nature
of the case completely exemplified in facts.”59 He damned with faint praise the analytical jurists’
endeavor “to construct a system of jurisprudence [founded] . . . on the observation, comparison,
and analysis of the various legal conceptions.” According to Maine, these efforts were
“indispensable, if for no other object, for the purpose of clearing the head.”60
When modern legal scholars highlight Maine’s “lack of concern with rigorous juristic
argument,” his “lack of interest in method,” the absence of “coherence of approach” in his work,
and his rejection of the pursuit of “mere logical symmetry,” they could just as well be describing
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Carter.61 It is these qualities, above all, that place Carter in the tradition of English historical
jurisprudence.
In sum, however, there are too many significant differences between Carter’s thought and
that of Savigny and Maine for him to be considered a mere imitator, or even a close follower, of
either. A careful comparison of Carter with these giants of European historical jurisprudence
leads to the conclusion he was, at his core, an American original.

II. Through a (German) Glass Darkly: Roscoe Pound’s Vision of Carter
Carter largely disappeared from American legal scholarship after about 1930. During the
remainder of the century, his work was occasionally cited, but rarely closely analyzed. When
scholars deigned to mention Carter, they often caricatured him as a rigidly logical jurist in the
service of big business. Roscoe Pound (1870-1964) bears much of the responsibility for this
neglect and misrepresentation.
Pound, who became Dean of the Harvard Law School in 1916, was probably the most
influential American legal scholar of the first quarter of the twentieth century. Like John
Chipman Gray, he acknowledged Carter’s influential role in late nineteenth-century legal
thought.62 But whereas Gray discussed Carter’s theories critically but respectfully, Pound treated
the lawyer with barely concealed contempt. As will be explained below, his disdain rested on a
shallow understanding of Carter’s jurisprudence and politics, and in particular on his unfounded
assumption that Carter’s jurisprudence was essentially equivalent to Savigny’s.
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Pound began referring to Carter regularly in 1908, the year after the posthumous
publication of Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function. In 1909, Pound wrote his negative review
of Carter’s book in Political Science Quarterly.63 He opened the review by stating: “This work,
bearing the date of the twentieth century, is in reality to be placed a quarter of a century earlier.
It cites the authorities, considers the problems and breathes the spirit of twenty-five years ago.”64
After several pages of critical analysis dismissing Carter’s theories as misguided and
amateurishly derivative, Pound concluded the review with a half-hearted tribute to the late author
and a final, stinging dismissal:

One need not say that any book from Mr. Carter’s pen deserves and repays careful and
thoughtful reading. The case of the common-law lawyer against legislation is put clearly,
forcibly and skilfully [sic] by a master of advocacy. As an argument of an advocate
retained to make a case against the imperative theory and the activity of American
legislatures, it is admirable. As a contribution to jurisprudence, it has appeared too late,
and it is to be doubted if the author’s memory is well served thereby.65

Interestingly, despite the review’s characterization of Carter as an irrelevant dinosaur,
Pound continued to refer to him frequently in later pieces. (His deliciously ironic 1913
appointment as the Carter Professor of General Jurisprudence at Harvard may have contributed
to his continuing interest.) Indeed, Pound published his most extensive consideration of Carter,
an article in the George Washington Law Review, almost a quarter of a century after brushing
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him aside in the book review.66 Throughout his career, Pound grudgingly acknowledged Carter’s
important role in the history of American legal thought, even as he attacked the lawyer’s
jurisprudence. He viewed Carter as the leading American representative of the historical school
of jurisprudence, a school that, in Pound’s eyes, dominated the end of the nineteenth century.

Carter’s Place in Pound’s Legal History
One of Pound’s most significant contributions to legal scholarship was his insightful, if
overly schematic, division of western jurists into three groups—the Analytical School, the
Philosophical School, and the Historical School.67 The Analytical School, which rose to
importance in the nineteenth century, was typified in England by Austin and in Germany by
Jhering. In Pound’s words, the analytical jurists “regard the law as something made consciously
by lawgivers, legislative or judicial. . . . They see chiefly the force and constraint behind legal
rules. To them, the sanction of law is enforcement by the judicial organs of the state, and
nothing that lacks an enforcing agency is law.”68
The Philosophical School, as Pound defined it, had roots in ancient Roman law and was
“the longest-continued method of legal science.” Dominant in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, but with ongoing influence afterward in both Europe and America, the school
encompassed a variety of approaches, ranging from Rousseauist natural law theory to Neo-
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Hegelianism.69 Philosophical jurists, in contrast to analytical jurists, believed that law is found,
not made, and they tended to “look at the ethical and moral bases of rules rather than at their
sanction.”70
Historical jurisprudence, according to Pound, was the last of the three methods to
develop. He characterized this school as follows:

1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

They consider the past rather than the present of law.
They regard the law as something that is not and in the long run cannot be made
consciously.
They see chiefly the social pressure behind legal rules. To them, sanction is to be
found in the habits of obedience, displeasure of one’s fellowmen [sic], public
sentiment and opinion, or the social standard of justice.
Their type of law is custom, or those customary modes of decision that make up a
body of juristic tradition or case law.
As a rule, their philosophical views have been Hegelian. . . .71

Pound identified two subgroups of the Historical School: “the German Historical School, whose
method is philosophical (indeed often metaphysical) and historical, and an English Historical
School, whose method is comparative and historical.”72 Savigny was the intellectual father of
the former group, and Sir Henry Maine was the most esteemed member of the latter.
Pound dated the genesis of historical jurisprudence in Europe to the work of Savigny in
the early 1800s. As noted above, Pound conjectured that the historical approach made its first
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appearance in American legal academia in the Roman Law class that Luther Cushing taught at
Harvard from 1849 to 1851.73 Nevertheless, Pound thought the Historical School had limited
influence in the United States until about 1870, when increasing numbers of American students
starting reading Maine’s work and studying in Germany.74 By the end of the century, according
to Pound, the Historical School dominated American legal thought. In 1911, he declared that
historical jurisprudence “in recent times has been, perhaps is still, the method most in vogue.”
Later in the same article, he asserted, with more confidence, that the Historical School continued
to have “almost uncontested supremacy . . . in our institutions of higher learning.”75
Pound dubbed Carter the “American apostle of the nineteenth-century historical
jurisprudence.”76 Indeed, as noted above, when Pound discussed the Historical School’s
influence in the United States, Carter was usually the only scholar he referred to by name. By
identifying Carter as the leader of this dominant school of thought, Pound assigned him a critical
role in the nation’s legal history. According to Pound, “Certainly no one could speak with more
assurance [than Carter] for the best of American science of law as it stood . . . in 1890.”77
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Carter’s Exclusion from Pound’s Sociological Jurisprudence
Why, then, was Pound so dismissive of Carter’s work? His dislike of the lawyer may
have been, in part, personal. Although it is unclear whether the two men ever met, the Nebraskaborn Pound seems to have been predisposed to resent eastern elite reformers of Carter’s variety.
This attitude was reflected in a letter Pound wrote to his parents from Harvard Law School in
1889, after hearing an address by Theodore Roosevelt, then the United States Civil Service
Commissioner. “He talked very virtuously and gave us considerable rot. . . . Everything is to be
‘reformed.’ . . . Whatever mugwumpy ideas I may have had before I came have been thoroughly
dispelled and I shall be content to be an offensive partisan the rest of my days.”78 Although
Pound later embraced Roosevelt’s progressive wing of the Republican party, he may never have
overcome his instinctive bias against northeastern gentry reformers—a type epitomized by James
Coolidge Carter.
Regardless of whether Pound bore such personal animus toward Carter, however, there
were more substantive explanations for his critical reaction to the New Yorker. Pound was a
scholar with a modernist agenda, even when he wrote legal history. He viewed Carter primarily
as the representative a dangerously obsolete mode of thought that continued to vie for
predominance with his own “sociological jurisprudence,” which suited the conditions of
twentieth-century America.
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Pound’s main scholarly project, early in his career, was to identify and advance a new
school of law to replace the philosophical, historical, and analytical approaches. The primary
goal of his sociological jurisprudence was “to enable and to compel law-making, and also
interpretation and application of legal rules, to take more account, and more intelligent account,
of the social facts upon which law must proceed and to which it is to be applied.”79 To advance
this mission, Pound urged a social-scientific approach to law and a concomitant rejection of
lawmaking based on deduction from abstract conceptions. He contended that the urban
industrial conditions of the twentieth century demanded an attention to social facts and an
abandonment of the radically individualistic jurisprudence of the nineteenth century. Moreover,
according to Pound, these modern social and economic developments required that legislation
replace the common law as the primary mode of lawmaking in the United States.80
In Pound’s view, all three of the major jurisprudential schools of the nineteenth-century
violated important tenets of sociological jurisprudence and thus were unsuited to the modern age.
The Philosophical School used pure conceptions to uphold individual rights and, through its
influence on constitutional interpretation, to strike down needed legislation.81 The Analytical
School, with its affection for formal perfection and logical deduction, neglected the practical
ends of law.82 Finally, the Historical School, with its focus on customary standards, doubted the
efficacy of legislation or any other kind of conscious lawmaking. Furthermore, although
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historical jurisprudence was not inevitably a jurisprudence of conceptions, it was, Pound
thought, dominated by Savigny’s metaphysical heirs. In Pound’s eyes, Carter was one of these
conceptualistic disciples of Savigny and thus was an impediment to the Sociological School’s
ascension in America.
Pound’s criticisms of Carter clustered around several themes, reviewed below. In some
instances, Pound’s observations were cogent, but in others, his lack of attention to the details of
Carter’s writings led him astray. His rigid division of jurists into different schools allowed little
nuance in treating individual scholars. Although Carter’s jurisprudence undeniably mirrored
Savigny’s in certain respects, there were also important differences, discussed above, that Pound
failed to discern. By pigeonholing Carter as a Savigny-inspired “metaphysical historical jurist,”
Pound blinded himself to various ways in which Carter’s thought was actually compatible with
his own “sociological” approach.

Pound’s Criticism of Carter’s Antilegislative Stance
Some of the links that Pound drew between Carter and Savigny were valid. For example,
as explained above, the two jurists shared a visceral resistance to lawmaking by legislation.
Pound, by contrast, was the American legal academy’s leading champion of legislation during
the first two decades of the twentieth century.83 In his view, legislation was the most important
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mode of “conscious lawmaking.”84 In his early writings, he frequently discussed the advantages
of legislation and condemned judges’ and jurists’ efforts to restrict the scope and efficacy of
statutes. He argued that courts, with their limited resources and expertise, could not be the
primary vehicles for a modern law based on sociological principles. “Judicial law-making
cannot serve us. . . . We must soon have a new-starting point that only legislation can afford.
That we may put the sociological, the pragmatic theory behind legislation, is demonstrating [sic]
every day.”85
Pound must have viewed with ambivalence (or perhaps devilish delight) his occupation
of a chair that Carter had endowed at Harvard Law School with instructions that the holder
“expose the pernicious effects of legislation.”86 In Pound’s eyes, Carter’s resistance to
legislation was the most objectionable and outmoded facet of his thought. Pound condemned his
benefactor for asserting with “all the fervor of a preacher, that legislation, except when
declaratory, was a futile attempt to make what could not be made.”87
In his review of Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function, Pound seemed most irked by the
book’s treatment of legislation. He acidly observed, “Not only is Mr. Carter persuaded that the
true field of legislation is a very narrow one, but he is clear that courts should be jealous of
encroachment, and conceives that strict construction of statutes in derogation of the common law
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and assumption that such legislation is declaratory only constitute a ‘wise doctrine’ to apply to
modern legislation.” Pound hypothesized (correctly) that Carter’s hostility to legislative
lawmaking was rooted in “the deep-seated aversion to legislation as a form of law which the
hasty and ill-considered Draft Codes have brought about in the bar of New York.” Only this
background could explain Carter’s “deliberate assertion in 1905 that statutes are of necessity
crude, ill-adapted to the case to which they are to be applied, unenforced and incapable of
enforcement.” Pound’s review condemned Carter’s failure to recognize that “[n]ot merely the
growing point but also the center of gravity of our law is shifting to legislation.”88
Pound seems not to have noticed the concessions Carter made in Law: Its Origin,
Growth, and Function (particularly toward the end of the book) to the growing need for
legislation in an urban industrial society. Moreover, Pound apparently was unaware that Carter
had acknowledged the beneficence of many types of legislation in his other writings, in his
speeches, and even his brief for the railroads in Smyth v. Ames, the Supreme Court case that
imposed substantive due process limitations on legislative ratemaking.89 As I will explain
below, Carter’s thoroughgoing hostility toward codification did not extend automatically to other
varieties of statutes. Nonetheless, Carter undeniably was predisposed to resist legislative
solutions. In this respect, Pound did not misperceive Carter by comparing him to Savigny.
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Pound’s Criticism of Carter’s Customary-Declaratory Theory of Law
Pound also accurately discerned a parallel between, on the one hand, Savigny’s linkage
of law to the “common consciousness of the people” or Volkgeist, and, on the other hand,
Carter’s equation of law with the “social standard of justice” or “custom.” Pound correctly
perceived that for both of these nineteenth-century jurists, the customary source of the law had
normative as well as descriptive implications. Just as Savigny believed that the link between law
and Volkgeist demanded that law’s development be controlled by academic jurists rather than
legislators, Carter maintained that the customary roots of the court-centered common law made it
superior to codes and statutes. Therefore, when Pound challenged the truth and wisdom of
Carter’s customary-declaratory theory of law, the fact that he viewed Carter as a Savigny
imitator did not lead him astray.
Pound contended that Carter’s equation of law and social custom was simply inaccurate.
He mocked “Mr. Carter’s theory . . . that custom is not merely a source of law, but is law, and
vice versa that law is custom.”90 According to Pound, simple observation disproved Carter’s
thesis that “the customs of popular action are law–i.e., are administered in judicial proceedings
as rules of decision.”91 Pound argued that law represented judicial custom, or “juristic
development of the analogy that chanced to be at hand when the institution or doctrine was
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formative,” at least as often as it represented social custom.92 Indeed, judges frequently clung to
such lines of development “in the face of convenience and of the experience of the
community.”93
Pound did not deny that the social standard of justice affected the evolution of law. He
explained, “The law seeks to . . . adjust the relations of every man with his fellow so as to accord
with the moral sense of the community.”94 Nevertheless, Pound rejected Carter’s view that
custom’s role made judging nondiscretionary. He contended that Carter’s declaratory theory
was particularly untenable in light of modern conditions.

Very likely in a relatively simple, homogeneous society there may be a substantial unity
of individual social ideals, as there was largely in pioneer, rural, agricultural America.
Probably in Mr. Carter’s formative youth in rural New England there was very largely a
social standard of justice for that section. . . . But . . . there is no such settled and
detailed social standard of justice in a heterogeneous, complex social order in the urban
industrial society of today. As things are now, we find many divergent standards of
justice in competition . . . If . . . we look at the course of decision as it takes place, we
must see that it is not a discovery of a given social standard of justice but a valuing of
claims and choice of starting points with reference to ideals traditionally received and
held authoritative by bench and bar which is decisive.95

In Pound’s words, one of the main features of sociological jurisprudence was that “we
[have] come to think of the task of the legal order as one of reconciling or harmonizing
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conflicting and overlapping interests.”96 Carter, by contrast, acknowledged the growing diversity
and complexity of American civilization only reluctantly, and late in his career. This complexity
never worked its way to the core of Carter’s jurisprudence. Instead, it remained a problematic
development that Carter strove to accommodate.
Pound was genuinely troubled by the normative and practical implications of Carter’s
customary jurisprudence. Although Carter embraced various progressive efforts toward the end
of his life, he stuck to his core belief that attempts to impose an ideal vision on a society not
prepared to receive it were futile and often harmful.97 Pound, by contrast, wanted law to
transcend society and thus to improve it. He described this difference between Carter and
himself in his 1933 analysis of “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”:

The historical jurist of forty years ago agreed with the analytical jurist in excluding all
ideal element from the law. When Mr. Carter speaks of the ideal in law he does not mean
an ideal element as part of the authoritative materials of judicial and administrative
action. . . . Today, on the other hand there is renewed recognition of an ideal element as
part of the law in the sense that it is part, and for many purposes a controlling part, of the
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authoritative materials in which courts are bound to find the grounds of decision and by
which they are bound to be guided in their determinations.98

Pound abhorred the passivity that Carter’s customary-declaratory theory of law instilled
in judges and legislators. The sociological jurisprudence Pound favored “regard[ed] law as a
social institution which may be improved by intelligent human effort, and h[e]ld it their duty to
discover the best means of furthering and directing such effort.”99 He rejected the Historical
School’s assumption that “the human experience by which legal principles were discovered was
determined in some inevitable way[,] . . . not a matter of conscious human endeavor.”100 Pound
did not want lawmakers to view their role as one of passively reflecting ineluctable social
developments; he wanted them to strive to solve problems and shape a good society.

Pound’s (Exaggerated) Criticism of Carter’s Neglect of Social Science
Despite the undeniable parallels between Savigny’s and Carter’s jurisprudence, there
were also some important differences that might have made Pound more sympathetic to Carter, if
he had recognized them. For example, in Pound’s eyes, another deficient aspect of Carter’s
jurisprudence was his neglect of social science.

Forty years ago law was thought of a self-sufficient and the science of law as quite
independent of any other of what we now call the social sciences. . . . Now, on the other
hand, we seek a certain unification of the social sciences. Jurisprudence is no longer held
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self-sufficient. Economics, sociology, ethics, psychology, as well as politics and
philosophy, are to be drawn upon; law is to be studied as part of the whole process of
social control.101

Here, Pound veered off course by linking Carter with the German Historical School.
Savigny’s thought truly bore no connection to modern social science. He viewed law as rooted
in his nation’s culture, but, as Matthias Reimann explains: “Savigny’s concept of ‘culture’ was
not anthropological but intellectual. ‘Culture’ was not the totality of the habits of a people, but
the characteristics of its intellectual life. . .

In respect to law, therefore, the jurists represented

the nation as a culture.”102
Carter’s jurisprudence, by contrast, represented a fledgling merger of law and social
science. He cannot be considered a true sociological jurist in this respect; his social science was
so rudimentary as to hardly deserve the name. Nonetheless, Carter shared Pound’s commitment
to the “study of the actual social effects of legal institutions and legal doctrines.”103 He
anticipated Pound’s famous interest in “law in action” in addition to “law in books.”104 For
Carter, case reports were “but a part of the great territory of fact which it is the business of the
lawyer and jurist to explore. Life itself is a moving spectacle of numberless forms of conduct the
study of which is necessary to the full equipment of the lawyer or the judge.”105
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Although Pound himself completely overlooked this facet of Carter’s thought, others
were more insightful. For example, in 1910, a professor of sociology wrote:

It is certainly an encouraging sign that the late Hon. James C. Carter, in his valuable
lectures on ‘Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function,’ recognized at the outset that the
subject he was dealing with was a part of the field of sociology. When an eminent
lawyer and legal thinker takes such a position, it is perhaps time to emphasize that the
foundations of the science of law, or jurisprudence, must be laid in a general knowledge
of human society, and especially in a knowledge of the principles of its organization,
development, and functioning. Of course, those who are content with the mere
knowledge of the law . . . as a system of rules, will have little interest in any inquiry into
its foundations in other sciences. But . . . a proper understanding of law and legal theory
can only be obtained through the study of the social sciences, especially sociology.106

Pound had greater faith than Carter in the efficacy of legislation and hence a greater
devotion to “[s]erious scientific study of how to make our huge annual output of legislation and
judicial interpretation effective.”107 Nevertheless, Carter anticipated sociological jurisprudence
in his 1895 American Bar Association presidential address, when he called for “an increased
study by our profession of the science of legislation . . . in its broadest extent.” In that speech, he
declared that legislation’s appropriate role could be determined only with a grasp of “the
fundamental elements of economic science, and the principles upon which sociological inquirers
are generally agreed.”108
Pound and Carter shared a particular interest in the question of enforcement, and they
similarly argued that law often was not enforceable in the face of popular disrespect for it.
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Indeed, Pound’s explanation for this phenomenon closely echoed Carter’s customary theory.109
He observed, in Carter-like language, that much legislation and judicial law “has been nugatory
in practice” because it “has not expressed social standards accurately.”110 Unlike Carter, Pound
was confident that with “preliminary study of the conditions to which it [is] to apply,” legislation
could be made to conform with the social standard of justice and thus be enforceable.111
Nonetheless, the two jurists shared a similar awareness of the limited effectiveness of law that
conflicted with societal norms.
Pound might have recognized Carter’s budding social-scientific ethos if, instead of
dwelling on the lawyer’s links with the Germans historicists, he had paid more attention to
Carter’s commonalities with Maine. Pound acknowledged that the historical school’s second,
non-metaphysical phase, of which Maine was the leading representative, was in some ways a
precursor to sociological jurisprudence. He observed:

It laid the foundations of a sound comparative legal history in place of the brilliant
superficiality of the eighteenth-century universal legal history in terms of rational
conjecture. . . . In its unification of jurisprudence and politics, if it was not the actual
forerunner of the unification of the social sciences which is going on today, at least it
kept alive one connection of jurisprudence when nearly all had been dissolved. Finally
through its attempt to generalize the phenomena of primitive law and of developed
systems by a theory of custom it led to the idea of the legal order as part of a wider social
control from which it cannot be dissociated. . . . This way of thinking did much to help
break down the conception of law as something existing of itself and for itself and to be
measured by itself; it prepared the way for the functional attitude of the legal science of
today.112
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Pound could have applied every one of these observations to Carter, as well as Maine.
But he did not do so.113 The Savigny parallel better served his effort to caricature Carter as a
detached formalist.

Pound’s Criticism of Carter’s (Imagined) Deductive Formalism
Pound also falsely posited that Carter and Savigny shared a commitment to formalistic
legal reasoning. Famously, he was a critic of such “mechanical jurisprudence.” He used this
term to describe the rigid application of rules in a way that neglected equity and policy. In his
famous article titled “Mechanical Jurisprudence,” the future Harvard dean argued:

Law is not scientific for the sake of science. Being scientific as a means toward an end, it
must be judged by the results it achieves, not by the niceties of its internal structure; it
must be valued by the extent to which it meets its end, not by the beauty of its logical
processes or the strictness with which its rules proceed from the dogmas it takes for its
foundation.114

Pound identified the quest for “reasonable and just solutions of individual causes” as one
of the core characteristics of sociological jurisprudence.115

[T]he very fact that laws are general rules, based on abstraction and the disregard of the
variable and less material elements in affairs, makes them mechanical in their operation.
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A mechanism is bound in nature to act mechanically, and not according to the
requirements of a particular case. Common experience teaches us that, while laws tend
to preserve and produce what is just and right in common estimation, “cases occur in
which, owing to its necessary mechanical operation, the moral law is violated and broken
by the positive law.”116

Pound thus resisted “any confining of the judicial function by too many hard and fast rules. . . .
Justice demands that instead of fitting the cause to the rule, we fit the rule to the cause.”117
As I have explained elsewhere, Carter rejected overly formalistic legal decision in a
strikingly similar way. He routinely condemned the inequities that resulted when judges applied
general rules mechanically to particular situations.118 Carter would have wholly agreed with the
following criticism, by Pound, of jurists who advocated the adoption of a complete code: “[T]he
application of law is not and ought not to be a purely mechanical process. Laws are not ends in
themselves; they are a means toward the administration of justice. Hence within somewhat wide
limits courts must be free to deal with the individual case so as to meet the demands of justice
between the parties.”119
Nonetheless, despite their shared commitment to case-specific fairness, Pound falsely
depicted Carter as an exponent and practitioner of mechanical jurisprudence. In his 1933
consideration of “The Ideal and the Actual,” Pound drew the following contrast between Carter’s
metaphysical Historical School and his own Sociological School:
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The metaphysical historical jurists took legal rights to be declaratory of natural rights
which were deduced from and necessary implications of the idea of freedom. . . . In
1930, by contrast, we had come to think of the task of the legal order as one of
reconciling or harmonizing conflicting and overlapping interests which were to be
discovered, not by deduction from some fundamental ideas, but by an actual inventory of
the claims actually asserted by concrete human beings and so pressing upon the law for
recognition.120

Pound thus condemned not only Carter’s jurisprudential views, but also his legal methodology.
To fully understand Pound’s formalistic portrait of Carter, it is necessary to revisit his
understanding of Carter’s place in legal history. As discussed above, Pound viewed the
jurisprudence of the pre-sociological age as divisible into three schools: the analytical, the
philosophical, and the historical. Pound did not see these schools as entirely autonomous; he
observed “a marked tendency to abandon the exclusive use of any one method, and to bring these
formerly divergent schools into something like accord.”121 The most important commonality
among the three schools was “a jurisprudence of conceptions, in which new situations are to be
met always by deduction from old principles, and criticism of premises with reference to the
ends to be subserved is neglected.”122 In other words, Pound thought all three schools tended to
be too mechanical.
The conceptualistic and formalistic qualities of philosophical jurisprudence were
obvious, for jurists from this tradition were “attempting to construct abstract systems by
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reasoning from first principles.”123 Although the analytical jurists viewed law as the conscious
product of lawmakers rather than as a system derived from preexisting natural or divine
principles, theirs was no less a jurisprudence of conceptions, in Pound’s view. He explained,
“The desire for formal perfection seizes upon [analytical] jurists. Justice in concrete cases
ceases to be their aim. Instead, they aim at thorough development of the logical content of
established principles through rigid deduction, seeking thereby a certainty which shall permit
judicial decision to be predicted in detail with absolute assurance.”124
At first glance, historical jurisprudence, based as it was on evolving societal customs,
would not seem to share the other schools’ conceptualistic and logical character. Pound,
however, saw the historical method, too, as one of “deduction from predetermined
conceptions.”125 Although historical jurists found their legal principles in a different
place—namely, in the history and social life of a people—the process they used to apply these
principles was “a purely logical one.”126 Pound explained:

From the sociological point of view, the chief objection to confining juristic study to the
historical method is similar to that first urged above against the analytical method. For
the Historical School also works a priori. It has deduced from and tested existing
doctrines by a fixed, arbitrary, external standard. Having no true philosophical method of
their own . . . when the German historical jurists overthrew the premises of the
Eighteenth-Century Law-of-Nature School, they preserved the method of their
predecessors, merely substituting new premises. . . . They sought the nature of right and
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of law in historical deduction from the Roman sources, from Germanic legal institutions,
and from the juristic development based thereon.127

Pound summed up the approach of the “metaphysical” historical jurists as follows: “An idea was
realizing in legal history. It could be discovered by historical research and when discovered its
implications could be developed logically.”128
Importantly, most (though not all) of Pound’s observations about the mechanical
character of historical jurisprudence referred to Savigny and the Germans, not to their less
metaphysical English counterparts, led by Maine. Pound was correct to see conceptualistic and
logical tendencies in the work of Savigny and his followers. As explained previously, the
systematic element of the German historical jurists’ intellectual project was at least as important
as the historical element, and at times the former completely overwhelmed the latter.
Against this background, it becomes clearer why Pound concluded that Carter was a
conceptualist. His mistaken assumption resulted from the fact that he associated Carter with the
German Historical School. Pound remarked that it was “curious to see something of the same
sort [of deductive methodology] in Mr. Carter” as in the Germans.129 Pound offered only one
excerpt from Carter’s work to illustrate the lawyer’s supposed embrace of Savigny’s dedication
to formal order. It was the following passage from “The Ideal and the Actual in the Law”:
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It is agreed that the true rule must somehow be found. Judge and advocates, all together,
engage in the search. Cases more or less nearly approaching the one in controversy are
adduced. Analogies are referred to. The customs and habits of men are appealed to.
Principles already settled as fundamental are invoked and run out to their consequences;
and finally a rule is deduced which is declared to be the one which the existing law
requires to be applied to the case.130

In fact, Carter diverged significantly from Savigny in this passage by declaring that
judges and lawyers should turn not only to formal legal sources, but also directly to the customs
and habits of the people. Nevertheless, Carter’s words do seem to demonstrate some
commitment to formal legal reasoning, if not to systematic order. In Carter’s total corpus of
writings, however, such statements are far outnumbered and ultimately overwhelmed by
statements reflecting the author’s antiformalistic resolve to deliver justice in particular cases by a
direct appeal to the social standard of justice. Indeed, the utter absence of formal methodology
or system in Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function led even Pound himself, on one occasion, to
question the extent of Savigny’s influence over the book.131
If Pound had carefully read Carter’s entire body of work, including The Proposed
Codification of the Common Law, he might, instead of concluding that Carter was too
mechanical, have deemed him to be not mechanical enough.132 Pound always emphasized the
need to reach a “proper balance between certainty and flexibility of application to particular
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cases.”133 He never viewed the “mechanical” aspect of law in a purely negative light; rather, he
thought that “mechanical action belongs to law; it is a proper quality of law.”134 Indeed, as early
as 1908, he concluded that “a proper proportion between the technical and the discretionary
elements in the administration of justice will give chief weight to the former.”135
Whereas Carter argued that a common law based on customary morality offered both
fairness and certainty, Pound thought these two goals were inevitably in tension with each
other.136 The diverse and complex modern civilization in which Pound lived offered a less
stable and less determinate foundation for law than did Carter’s quaint vision of an agrarian
society with homogenous customs. Pound explained: “[T]he jurisprudence of forty years ago
assumed that there was an absolute answer to every juristic question . . . Today, by contrast,
jurisprudence has become relativist. . . . Different conflicts or competings of interests must be
treated in different ways.”137 Consequently, he concluded, “no human being can tell how the
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social standard of justice will work on the judge’s mind before the judgment is rendered.”138
Unlike Carter, Pound viewed judges’ equitable resolution of cases as “discretionary.”139 And he
was more than a little ambivalent about such discretion. Too much judicial discretion
undermined “certainty and uniformity . . . the essential attributes of law.”140 Pound remarked:
“The commercial world demands rules. No man makes large investments trusting to uniform
exercise of discretion.”141
In light of Pound’s concern for legal certainty, he might well have excoriated Carter for
neglecting the importance of coherent legal rules. Pound completely overlooked the
antiformalistic aspects of Carter’s thought, however, and instead caricatured him as a deductive
logician. It is perhaps due to Pound’s flawed portrait of Carter that at least one prominent
scholar continues today to describe Carter as a “classical jurist” similar to Langdell.142

Pound’s Criticism of Carter’s (Exaggerated) Laissez-Faire Individualism
Pound also criticized Carter for anachronistically advancing a purely individualistic
vision of law—for maintaining that law’s purpose was (in Pound’s words) “to bring about and
maintain a regime of the maximum of abstract free individual self-assertion.”143 He
disapprovingly observed, “While [Carter] claims to be an historical jurist, his philosophical
138
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position is that of natural law, with individualism and the principles of Anglo-American common
law standing for nature.”144 Pound contended that Carter’s promotion of abstract individual
freedom took too little account of complex modern social conditions.145
Pound thought that the “conflict between the individualistic spirit of the common law and
the collectivist spirit of the present age” was one of the primary causes of popular dissatisfaction
with law in the early twentieth century.146 He observed: “Men have changed their views as to
the relative importance of the individual and of society; but the common law has not.”147 Pound
was particularly incensed by the way Gilded Age courts had injected an individualistic ethos into
the United States Constitution to strike down social welfare legislation.148
Although Carter’s scholarship had little to say about constitutional law, Pound linked him
directly to the distressing developments in this area, and not just because of his participation as a
lawyer in cases like Smyth v. Ames. Pound noted that Carter’s jurisprudential theories “were no
small factor in fashioning American judicial decisions of the last quarter of the nineteenth
century.”149 To Pound, Carter’s discussions of the limits of legislation had “the ring of the
decisions upon ‘right to pursue a lawful calling’ and ‘liberty of contract.’”150 With regard to
Carter’s statement (in Law: Its Origin, Growth, and Function) that the “sole function both of law
144
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and legislation . . . [is] to secure to each individual the utmost liberty which he can enjoy
consistently with the preservation of the like liberty of others,”151 Pound remarked, “It is this
kind of doctrine which makes constitutional provisions as to life, liberty and property barriers in
the way of social progress.”152
Like other aspects of Pound’s portrait of Carter, his depiction of the New Yorker as an
extreme proponent of laissez-faire derived in part from the fact that he equated Carter with
Savigny and the German historical jurists. According to Pound, continental historical
jurisprudence was “from the beginning a negative conception of the function of jurist and
legislator; it demanded a holding down of the legal order to the necessary minimum—to the least
which was required to realize freedom in men’s relations with each other.”153 In this connection,
he repeatedly cited Savigny’s definition of law: “The rules whereby the invisible boundaries are
determined within which the existence and activity of each individual gains secure and free
opportunity.”154 Pound also routinely emphasized the “Hegelian” character of German historical
jurisprudence, in particular its embrace of Hegel’s idea that “law realizes the idea of freedom”
and “[i]deal perfection in human relations is liberty.”155
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When discussing Carter’s laissez-faire ideology, Pound also linked him to Sir Henry
Maine. Like many scholars before and since, Pound simplistically reduced the essence of
Maine’s jurisprudence to the Englishman’s famous description of the course of legal evolution
“from status to contract.”156 Pound declared, “At bottom Maine’s theory is Hegelian. The idea
which is realizing is liberty—free individual self-assertion. The way in which it is realizing is a
progress from status to contract.”157 Pound asserted that Maine, along with the Germans, helped
cause the rise of laissez-faire constitutionalism in the United States. “Much in American
judicial decision with respect to master and servant, liberty of contract, and right to pursue a
lawful calling . . . is in reality merely the logical development of traditional principles of the
common law by men who . . . read every day in their scientific books of the progress from status
to contract . . . .”158
Pound may well have been correct that the libertarian aspects of German historical
jurisprudence influenced Carter; after all, Carter favorably quoted Savigny’s definition of
law—twice—in his book.159 There is no evidence, however, that Maine had a similar impact on
Carter. He never quoted Maine’s “status to contract” formulation in his published writings, and,
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as explained above, he saw the Englishman as an Austinian legislative positivist, not as an
exponent of limited government.160
In any event, regardless of the true extent of Savigny’s and Maine’s influence over
Carter, Pound arguably misunderstood all three when he identified them as uncompromising
laissez-faire individualists with natural law conceptions. Although Savigny’s writings certainly
manifested natural-law thinking,161 his views on the regulation of property were actually quite
complex and not clearly “laissez-faire.”162 Maine, for his part, was apparently a fairly committed
laissez-faireist, at least by the end of his life,163 but Pound’s suggestion that the Englishman was
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a natural law theorist ignored Sir Henry’s persistent efforts to demonstrate the absurdity of such
notions.164 Pound’s depiction of Carter with respect to laissez-faire individualism was probably
the most inaccurate of all. First of all, Pound’s contention that Carter’s “philosophical position
is that of natural law” disregarded Carter’s own emphatic rejection of natural law theories.
Carter declared: “In viewing the law as a body of rules proceeding from a supposed Law of
Nature—an invisible fountain of right—we are simply indulging in hypothesis. No such thing is
open to our observation, and consequently, not to our knowledge.”165
Furthermore, although Pound was certainly correct in describing the New Yorker’s
jurisprudence as more individualistic than his own, Carter’s laissez-faire individualism was not
nearly so extreme as Pound suggested. Carter did not, in fact, support the parade of horrible
“liberty of contract” cases condemned by Pound. During the 1890s, he began explicitly to
endorse exceptions to the laissez-faire principle such as tenement building regulations,
restrictions on child labor, factory safety statutes, and other “legislation . . . preventing evils
which arise from the competitive struggles of modern life in industrial pursuits.” Carter
remarked that an Illinois statute requiring that laborers be paid in “bankable money” (instead of
company scrip) was a measure “evidencing a bold, but perhaps not impolitic, estimate of the just
extent of legislative power in growing, thickening and active populations.” 166 Interestingly,
Pound himself later specifically condemned the Illinois Supreme Court case that struck down
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this statute.167 In other words, as to the constitutionality of this particular legislation, the two
men agreed entirely.
If Carter was a laissez-faireist, he was certainly an ambivalent one.168 In his book, he
observed:

When we consider the enormous mass of necessary legislation found in modern
societies, we are almost led to doubt the soundness of the maxim that the best
government is that which governs least, as well as the soundness of the teaching
that the sole function of government and of law is to secure to every man the
largest possible freedom of individual action consistent with the preservation of
the like liberty for every other man.169

In Carter’s evolving customary vision of law, the line marking the limits of state
regulation was not static, but rather moved along with the people’s evolving perception of what
was appropriate.170 His deep-seated apprehension that government could be used to advance
“selfish purposes and personal enrichment” coexisted with an understanding that “[w]ithin its
province [legislation] is capable of a work of great and increasing beneficence.”171 Carter
acknowledged that legislation was “the source of so many advantages” and that it was frequently

167

Pound, “Liberty of Contract,” 463. The case was Frorer v. People, 141 Ill. 171 (1892).

168

Carter, “1895 ABA Presidential Address,” 229. On acceptable functions for written law, see Carter,
Proposed Codification, 17-21; Carter, Provinces, 52-55; Carter, Origin, Growth, and Function, 254-62.
169

Carter, Origin, Growth, and Function, 335.

170

See Lewis Grossman, “Extending the Revisionist Project,” Law and History Review 20 (2002): 640-41.

171

Carter, “1895 Municipal League Address,” 271; Carter, Origin, Growth, and Function, 135.

49

a desirable, or even necessary, supplement to the common law in the regulation of private affairs.
In 1894, Carter proclaimed, “Do not legislate against the rich, but yet legislate for the poor.172
We have no idea how Savigny might have reassessed his own philosophy if he had
survived into the age of urban industrialism. The fact that Carter seemed to adjust his own views
to accommodate such developments demonstrates another flaw in Pound’s portrait of historical
jurisprudence. Pound’s discussions of this school and the other nineteenth-century schools
assumed that they (unlike his own Sociological School) were purely intellectual constructs,
detached from and unresponsive to socioeconomic developments. However, a close analysis of
Carter’s historical jurisprudence demonstrates that he accommodated his thought to the needs of
modern society.
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